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Regulation and opportunism: How much activism do we need?

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Título:: Regulation and opportunism: How much activism do we need?
Tema:: Activism; corporate social responsability; voting and regulation
Descripción:: This paper analyzes the current trend towards firms¿ self-regulation as opposed to the formal regulation of a negative externality. Firms respond to increasing activism in the market (conscious consumers that take into account the external effects of their purchase) by providing more socially responsible goods. However, because regulation is the outcome of a political process, an increase in activism might imply an inefficiently higher externality level. This may happen when a majority of non-activist consumers collectively free-ride on conscious consumers. By determining a softer than optimal regulation, they benefit from the behavior of firms, yet they have access to cheaper (although less efficient) goods.
Fuente:: Documentos de Trabajo ( CEMFI ), Nº. 8, 2005
Idioma:: English
Autor/Productor:: Calveras, Aleix; Llobet, Gerard; Ganuza Fernández, Juan José
Editor:: Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI)
Derechos:: LICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: http://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: http://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
Fecha:: 2005
Tipo de recurso:: text (article)

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1. <dc:title>Regulation and opportunism: How much activism do we need?</dc:title>
2. <dc:creator>Calveras, Aleix</dc:creator>
3. <dc:creator>Llobet, Gerard</dc:creator>
4. <dc:creator>Ganuza Fernández, Juan José</dc:creator>
5. <dc:subject>Activism</dc:subject>
6. <dc:subject>corporate social responsability</dc:subject>
7. <dc:subject>voting and regulation</dc:subject>
8. <dc:description>This paper analyzes the current trend towards firms¿ self-regulation as opposed to the formal regulation of a negative externality. Firms respond to increasing activism in the market (conscious consumers that take into account the external effects of their purchase) by providing more socially responsible goods. However, because regulation is the outcome of a political process, an increase in activism might imply an inefficiently higher externality level. This may happen when a majority of non-activist consumers collectively free-ride on conscious consumers. By determining a softer than optimal regulation, they benefit from the behavior of firms, yet they have access to cheaper (although less efficient) goods.</dc:description>
9. <dc:publisher>Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI)</dc:publisher>
10. <dc:date>2005</dc:date>
11. <dc:type>text (article)</dc:type>
12. <dc:identifier>http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=1367632</dc:identifier>
13. <dc:source>Documentos de Trabajo ( CEMFI ), Nº. 8, 2005</dc:source>
14. <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
15. <dc:rights>LICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: http://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: http://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI</dc:rights>
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